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Highlights
• An approach towards Nord Stream 2 (NS2) will set a precedent for 
other new pipelines importing gas from third countries into EU.  
• The EU-part of NS2 should follow rules of the Third Energy Pack-
age and the non-EU part of NS2 could either be subject to EU law by 
territorial extension or be governed by an EU-Russia agreement relat-
ing to the whole pipeline. The latter would need to be in line with the 
EU Treaties, which explicitly place an obligation on the EU to ‘ensure 
security of energy supply’ and ‘ensure the functioning of the energy 
market’.
• Gas Market Directive should apply to the part of NS2 that is located 
in the EU territory. It requires a full liberalisation regime, and it 
remains unclear if derogations from the regime are possible. The EU 
part and the non-EU part of NS2 are legally connected and regulating 
one part influences the other. In case of lack of an EU-Russia interna-
tional agreement, the non-EU part of NS2 could be subject to EU law 
through a territorial extension, which is widespread in EU law. 
• NS2 will have a substantial impact on the current arrangements for the 
gas security of supply. New stress tests are necessary to assess the meas-
ures needed to mitigate the impact of NS2 on the security of supply. 
• NS2 will impede competition in the EU energy market and will 
deter necessary investments in the gas infrastructure. The existing 
divide between Western and Eastern markets will be deepened, and 
the cost for the EU of establishing a well-interconnected market will 
significantly increase. The final settlement of the EU antimonopoly 
investigation against Gazprom should find remedies for these market 
challenges. 
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1.  Introduction
1.1 Controversial Gas Pipeline
 e NS2 gas pipeline is one of the most controversial 
international pipeline projects. O  cially the pipe-
line is planned to be operational by the end of 2019. 
 e project consists of two new strings with a total 
capacity of 55 billion cubic meters (27.5 bcm each). 
Together with two strings of Nord Stream 1, the new 
combined capacity would be 110 bcm. Such high 
volumes mean that the project, if completed, will 
have signi cant consequences for the EU. All four 
strings of Nord Stream could transport almost 70% 
of Russian gas export to the EU.  
1.2 Political Issues
NS2 has signi cantly divided the EU. At least one-
third of Member States expressed opposition against 
the project. Although this paper does not deal with 
political issues, it is worth noting three reasons why 
the project has been challenged.  
•  e project goes against agreed aims of the Energy 
Union. Instead of desired diversi cation of routes 
and suppliers, NS2 concentrates both. 
• Russia has been subject to EU sanctions due to its 
military invasion in Ukraine and breaching fun-
damental principles of international law. In some 
of the EU’s Member States Russia is perceived as a 
security threat.  
•  e project will have a serious impact on Ukraine, 
which is a member of the Energy Community. 
Ukraine will lose important revenue sources and 
could be exposed to additional security risks.
1.3 Financial Issues
 e cost of the project is estimated at 9,5 billion 
euro, and Gazprom is not able to  nance it on its 
own.  e original  nancing model collapsed due to 
objections of the Polish competition regulator issued 
in July 2016. As a result, the Western European com-
panies (BASF, E.ON, Engie, OMV and Shell) le  the 
NS2 consortium. Still being interested in the project, 
they have announced supporting NS2 through loans 
of almost 5 billion euro in total. 
 e new US sanctions law, adopted in August 2017, 
made  nancing the NS2 project even more problem-
atic as it could target any company involved in the 
project. It grants the president the power to impose 
sanctions on those investing in and contributing to 
building Russian exporting pipelines.  e mere pos-
sibility of sanctions has created additional  nancial 
risk. 
 e result of litigation between Ukrainian Na ogaz 
and Gazprom in the Stockholm arbitration court 
might lead to further  nancial implications.  e  rst 
interim award of the arbitration panel was very posi-
tive for the Ukrainian company. Final awards – both 
in the case on pricing and supply and in the case on 
transit – are expected by the end of November 2017. 
2. Application of EU Law to Nord Stream 2 
NS2 is being constructed in a di erent legal situation 
than its earlier predecessor. Whereas Nord Stream 
1 was built before the  ird Energy Package (TEP) 
entered into force, NS2 operates in the regulatory 
environment based on it. 
 e legal situation of NS2 primarily depends on 
being in or outside EU territory. One has to be, there-
fore, very precise when using the phrase ‘application 
of TEP to NS2’. First and foremost, its application is 
referring to the part that lies within EU territory and 
not to the whole pipeline. Only a er should a legal 
arrangement for the remaining part be considered. 
For this reason, terms like ‘onshore’ or ‘o shore’ do 
not matter much in the legal analysis from the per-
spective of the Gas Market Directive. Not to mention 
that the latter does not even use such terms. 
 e EU part and the non-EU part of NS2 cannot be 
easily legally disconnected because of the way the 
pipeline will be constructed. From a technical point 
of view, the gas pipeline will constitute one whole – 
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there will be one single entry point in Russia and one 
exit point in the EU. As a result, it is not possible to 
establish rules for the one part without consequences 
for the other. 
2.1  e EU Part of Nord Stream 2 
NS2 will run through the territory of some Member 
States and therefore through the territory of the EU. 
For this reason, EU law in its entirety applies to parts 
of the pipeline that lie in the German and Danish 
territory (Denmark – 88 km of territorial waters; 
Germany – 50 km of land territory, internal waters 
and territorial waters).  e Gas Market Directive is 
the key EU legislation applicable to the EU part of 
NS2.
 e directive leaves no doubt as far as its territo-
rial scope is concerned. It establishes common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas. According to 
the EU Treaties – hierarchically the most important 
source of EU law – the internal market is de ned 
as ‘an area without internal frontiers” (Art 26 par 2 
TFEU). In other words, the directive refers to the EU 
territory and does not limit the basic principle that 
EU law is applicable in its territory (enshrined in Art 
52 TEU and Art 355 TFEU). 
 e directive does not provide any grounds for a spe-
cial treatment of NS2 in the EU territory. According 
to de nitions speci ed in the directive, the EU part 
of NS2 can only be classi ed as a transmission gas 
Graph 1  e planned route of NS2, including borders of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. 
Source: ESPOO Atlas (NS2, April 2017)
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pipeline.  e term ‘transmission’ is de ned very 
broadly as ‘the transport of natural gas through a net-
work’.  ere are only two instances that are excluded 
from this de nition, namely upstream pipelines and 
distribution pipelines, both of which de nitions are 
not adequate for NS2.3 Consequently, any pipeline 
that transports natural gas through a network and 
does not belong to the two excluded categories is a 
transmission pipeline.
 e Gas Market Directive creates a special category 
of a transmission pipeline, namely an intercon-
nector, which is subject to additional rules. However, 
its de nition requires connecting national transmis-
sion systems between Member States, which is not 
the case of NS2.
 e directive explicitly mentions pipelines trans-
porting gas from third countries without making it a 
special category as it does with interconnectors. As a 
result, such pipelines fall under a very broad de ni-
tion of a transmission pipeline.  e recital 35 reads: 
“ e possibility of temporary derogations should 
apply, for security of supply reasons, in particular, to 
new pipelines within the Community transporting 
gas from third countries into the Community”. Cer-
tainly, the EU part of NS2 belongs to ‘new pipelines 
within the Community’ and transports gas from 
Russia into the Community. Contrary to what the 
recital says, the directive does not provide for dero-
gation later on in the text.4  e importance of this 
issue is, however, limited and pertains only to the 
question whether derogation can be granted or not. 
A lack of precision for speci c legal arrangements 
cannot undermine the general fact that the directive 
regulates such a pipeline. 
Putting aside the issue whether derogation to the 
NS2 could be applied (this, in turn, would lead to 
3.   e upstream pipeline is out of the question because NS2 is neither part of a production project nor it is connected to it.  e 
distribution pipeline requires connection to customers whereas NS2 connects the Russian and the German systems instead. 
4.  ‘Major new gas infrastructure, i.e. interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities, may, upon request, be exempted, for a de-
 ned period of time’.  e use of ‘i.e.’ would suggest that derogations are possible only to the listed type of infrastructure. 
However, there are some other language versions of EU Treaties (having the same legal importance) that suggest the list to 
be just exemplary and thus not exhaustive. 
a demanding assessment enshrined in Article 36), 
there are three main legal challenges for the NS2 
project stemming from TEP: 
• Ownership Unbundling (OU): It means that a 
network ownership requires being separated from 
production and transport of gas.  is is not the 
case of Gazprom that is the only shareholder of 
NS2.
•  ird Party Access (TPA):  e problem lies in the 
Russian legislation, according to which Gazprom 
has the monopoly in exporting gas and in result 
has exclusive access to the pipeline.
• Non-discriminatory Tari  Setting: Tari s for 
gaining access to a pipeline need to be published 
and apply objectively without discrimination to all 
eligible customers. 
2.2  e Non-EU part of Nord Stream 2
Much less clear from the perspective of EU law is the 
situation of the remaining part of NS2.  e question 
remains open if the application of EU law should 
be extended beyond its borders due to a territorial 
extension that is pervasive in EU law. 
 ere is no doubt that in the EU territory (almost 140 
km of the pipeline) EU law is applicable, including 
the Gas Market Directive. Similarly, in the Russian 
territory, its law will apply (almost 120 km of the 
pipeline).  e remaining some 950 km of the pipe-
line is located in exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Unlike in 
its territory, no country enjoys full sovereign rights in 
EEZ. As a result, neither national or EU law provides 
legal regime therein but international law. According 
to the latter, EU legislation will be applicable only 
as far as environmental and resource exploitation 
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aspects are concerned (Article 56 of UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS). However, as 
mentioned earlier, the EU part and the non-EU part 
of NS2 are not legally disconnected and regulating 
one part in uences the other. Consequently, legal 
arrangements necessary in the EU territory would 
need to be applied in the remaining part of the pipe-
line.
Table 1  e NS2 rout 
Territory of the EU (Germany, Denmark) 140 km
Territory of Russia 120 km
Exclusive Economic Zones
(Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Finland)
950 km
 e territorial extension is widespread in EU law 
and applying it to a transnational pipeline would 
not be something unique.  e EU has succeeded in 
using access to its huge market as a tool to extend 
its norms abroad. In other words, imported goods 
or services need to follow conditions set by the EU 
to access its market. One can  nd many examples 
of such practice in several policy sectors, inter alia 
in climate change, environment, maritime transport, 
air transport, and  nancial services. Not to men-
tion even the most obvious case of extraterritoriality 
in EU competition law. Importantly, the European 
Court of Justice deems territorial extension in line 
with customary international law.5 Moreover, the 
WTO’s Appellate Body seems to agree upon ful l-
ment of certain conditions,6 which should not be 
problematic in the case of NS2. 
It is unlikely that Russia would easily consent to a 
territorial extension of EU law. It opposes EU regula-
tions of the energy sector and has initiated a WTO 
dispute against the EU  ird Energy Package. A  nal 
report of the WTO panel in this case is expected at 
the end of 2017.  
In such a situation the only way forward for the NS2 
project to continue is to attempt to settle the appli-
5.  See European Court of Justice, Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America ECLI:EU:C:2011:864
6.  See WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS/58/AB/R
cable law in an international agreement between the 
EU and Russia.  e agreement will need to be in 
line with the EU Treaties, which explicitly place an 
obligation on the EU to ‘ensure security of energy 
supply’ and ‘ensure the functioning of the energy 
market’ (Article 194TFEU).
3.  e Objective of Security of Supply
Security of supply is a legal requirement and not 
merely a political matter.  e objective of the 
security of supply has been written into EU primary 
law in the Treaty of Lisbon. Secondary legislation 
explicitly refers to it in many instances. As a result, 
guaranteeing security of supply belongs to the 
regulatory framework that NS2 needs to follow. 
 e construction of NS2 does not necessarily mean 
more Russian gas in the EU market but could lead 
to major changes of gas  ows in Europe, in par-
ticular in its Central and Eastern parts.  e cur-
rently existing routes through Belarus and Poland 
(Yamal gas pipeline) and through Ukraine (western 
corridor via Slovakia and southern corridor via 
Romania) could be seriously impacted. Depending 
on the extent of capacity allocation in Opal and 
Eugal (onshore extensions of NS1 and NS2) and the 
construction of Turkish Stream, they could be even 
completely switched o .  ere is clear evidence for 
the competition between the routes: when Gazprom 
started utilising more capacity in OPAL (following 
new exemptions granted in October 2016) amounts 
of gas sent through Yamal and Ukraine decreased.   
 e major changes of gas  ows pose several chal-
lenges to the EU security of supply:
•  e CEE countries will be at the end of a pipe-
line delivery system and their security will not be 
linked anymore to supplies to the Western mar-
kets.  ey will lose access to virtual reverse  ows. 
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•  e e  ciency of physical reverse  ows could 
become more critical. 
•  e pipeline congestion could appear because the 
demand in the East (which includes, in this case, 
Italy and parts of Germany) amounts to 150 bcm 
whereas the transport capacity from the West to 
the East is 110 bcm.7 
Addressing the security of supply challenges would 
require a thorough assessment. New stress tests that 
include the scenario of 110 bcm running through the 
Baltic Sea would need to be initiated. Only the results 
of these tests could give an idea for the investments 
required to mitigate the impact of the changing  ows 
to the security of supply. Moreover, the new results 
might lead to the necessity of rethinking the current 
division into groups under the Security of Supply 
Regulation.  
4.  e impact of Nord Stream 2 on the 
Internal Energy Market  
NS2 will mean more market power of Gazprom in 
the North-West Europe (NWE). Its dominant posi-
tion will increase in particularly in Germany.  ese 
changes will be enhanced by the decrease of EU 
gas production (in the UK and the Netherlands). 
Gazprom might intend to prevent arising of more 
competition in NWE to defend its market share. 
As demonstrated by Georg Zachmann, one way to 
achieve it would be o ering cheap gas from the Nord 
Stream route  rst to the NWE market before selling 
it eventually for a higher price on the markets of 
CEE.  e high volumes of available gas would lead 
7.  G Zachmann, ‘Nord Stream 2 – a Risk for the Internal Market and Security of Supply?’, presentation at the Bruegel confer-
ence ‘Di erent perspectives on Nord Stream II’ (Brussels, 2017)
8.  ibid.
9.  P Kotek, A Selei, B Takácsné Tóth, ‘ e Impact Of  e Construction Of  e NS2 Gas Pipeline On Gas Prices And Competi-
tion’ (Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research, Budapest, 2017)
10.  ibid. 
to the decrease of price and disincentivise other sup-
pliers to compete on the market.8 
Outcompeting will also take place in the CEE region 
but on a di erent level. Instead of competing on 
price levels, Gazprom will take advantage of under-
developed infrastructure and will disincentivise 
investments needed to attract new suppliers (LNG, 
Norwegian gas). E orts to increase competition in 
the CEE market might be abandoned and a develop-
ment of the market put in question.
As a result, the already existing divide between hub 
based Western markets and isolated Eastern markets 
will be even deepened. As demonstrated in the gas 
market modelling by Péter Kotek, Adrienn Selei and 
Borbála Takácsné Tóth, if NS2 becomes operational, 
the gas prices in Central, Eastern and Southern 
Europe will increase. Moreover, it will slow down the 
process of liberalisation. Without NS2, the capacity 
of pipelines bringing gas from the West would be 
mostly allocated to spot traded gas. With NS2 in 
place, the latter will be crowded out by long-term 
contracts of Gazprom.9 
New investments could address the existing West-
East price divergence. Despite much investment 
undertaken so far in CEE to ful l the aim of estab-
lishing a well-interconnected market, still, around 
890 million euro is needed to reach this objective. 
However, if NS2 is operational, the bill rises to 1880 
million euro.10 Moreover, the additional cost of 1 bil-
lion euro does not take into account stranded costs 
that will inevitably appear because already  nanced 
projects might not be utilised as they were originally 
planned.
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In assessing the impact of NS2 on the internal energy 
market, one should keep in mind that Gazprom has 
been subject to an investigation due to the abuse 
of its dominant position in CEE (Art 102 TFEU). 
 e formal proceedings were opened in 2012 and 
have moved recently to a  nal stage. A er Gazprom 
formally submitted its proposals of commitments 
addressing objections, it remains to be seen what 
would be the  nal Commission’s decision.  e set-
tlement should  nd remedies for the challenge of 
having a single competitive market.
An in-depth study, using a global gas market simu-
lation model, has revealed that the Gazprom’s pro-
posed commitments lead to ‘fundamental challenges 
for the current regulatory model in Europe to com-
plete the project of a single market for gas’.11 Chi 
Kong Chyong demonstrated that the possibility of 
changing delivery points (‘swap deals’) might have 
a positive impact on limiting Gazprom’s potential 
market power, price convergence of Russian gas in 
the CEE region, and connecting the latter to the 
more competitive NWE market.  e analysis argued, 
however, for several clari cations and amendments 
demonstrating that commitments o er too much 
uncertainty whether the positive changes would take 
place. Importantly, according to the research, the 
commitments pose challenges in regards to diversi-
 cation and energy security.  ey lead to an increase 
of the market share of Russian gas in some instances 
and no improvement in diversi cation in others. 
Additionally, they could negatively impact the uti-
lisation of strategic gas infrastructure and even lead 
to the disintegration of some markets from the rest 
of EU markets.
11.  CK Chyong, ‘An Assessment of Gazprom’s Proposed Commitments Concerning Central and Eastern European Gas Markets 
Using a Global Gas Market Simulation Model’ (Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge, 2017) 
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